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Wielding the Double-Edged Sword: Creating the
Perception of a Chinese Enterprise to Obtain and
Enforce Patent Protection in China
David A. Fazzolare*

I. INTRODUCTION

Obtaining and enforcing patent protection in China is a doubleedged sword. On the positive side, China has one of the fastest
growing economies among one of the world's largest potential
consumer markets. On the negative side, China has rampant piracy
and counterfeiting issues, as well as unsatisfactory enforcement of
patent rights.
A practical strategy for international businesses seeking to
successfully wield the double-edged sword of obtaining and
enforcing patent protection in China involves diminishing the
incentives for corruption, bribery, and local protectionism that favor
Chinese pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers. International
businesses can diminish these incentives by creating the perception of
a Chinese enterprise-that is, a business founded and operated in
China, presumably by Chinese nationals.
First, Part II of this Comment reviews concerns that
international businesses face in deciding whether to obtain and
enforce patent protection in China. In Part III, this Comment
provides reasons for obtaining patent protection in China. Part IV
explains why creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise can
diminish the incentives for corruption, bribery, and local
protectionism that traditionally favor Chinese pirates, counterfeiters,
and infringers. Part V then analyzes Chinese laws limiting foreign
investment in Chinese industries and laws governing the structural
organization and ownership of foreign investment capital.
International businesses must operate within the limits of these laws
to create the perception of a Chinese enterprise. Finally, Part VI
provides specific strategies that international businesses can use to
successfully create the perception of a Chinese enterprise.

* J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University (2009). The author is
a licensed patent agent.
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II. FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN DECIDING WHETHER TO
OBTAIN PATENT PROTECTION IN CHINA

International businesses must consider several factors when
deciding whether to obtain patent protection in China. They must
be aware of negative trends-namely corruption, bribery, and
protectionism-that currently undermine justice in the Chinese
judicial system. These contribute to a lack of impartiality, a lack of
transparency, unsatisfactory enforcement of patent rights, and
remedies that favor imitators over inventors.

A. The Judiciary)s Lack of Impartiality
Corruption, bribery, and protectionism undermine impartial
decision making in China. I First, judicial corruption stems from the
Communist Party's control over appointment and promotion of
senior judges. 2 With that control, Chinese courts exercise judicial
authority on behalf of the state,3 and thus on behalf of the Chinese
Communist Party. In fact, some suggest that the judiciary is strictly
controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.4 Given the direct
influence over the appointment and promotion of senior judges, it is
hard to imagine how judicial decisions in China can reflect anything
but the official Communist Party platform and its underlying
motivations and interests. Moreover, the use of informal
relationships to bypass formal legal processes has produced pervasive
corruption of the Chinese judiciary.s Personal connections are often
used to directly impair impartiality through the bribing of judges. 6
Second, pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers resort to bribery as
a means to thwart proper enforcement of patent protection. 7 In
particular, "Chinese provincial authorities, 'far away over the
mountains,' benefIt financially or politically from the proceeds of
piracy or, instead, turn a blind eye to powerful local interests that

1. Thomas E. Volper, Note, TRIPS EnjiJrcement in China: A Case /iJr Judicial
Transparency, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309, 313, 327 (2007).
2. See Eu Jin Chua, The Laws of the People's Republic of China: All Introduction ji,r
International Investors, 7 CHI. J.INT'L L. 133, 138 (2006).
3. Id. at 134.
4. Sec Volper, supra note 1, at 328-29.
5. Id. at 327.
6. Id.
7. See, e,q., Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor is Far Away: China's En/iJrcmlent of
Intellectual Property R(qhts Protection, 1986-2006,7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231,232-33 (2006).
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do."~ Under the influence of bribery, judges and administrators fail
to act impartially at the outset of investigating allegations of
infringement.'} As a result, otherwise meritorious claims of
infringement may be summarily dismissed; efforts to investigate the
infringement claims may be relaxed; or early remedies, such as
preliminary injunctions to stop infringement, may not be awarded.
Third, local protectionism pervades the judicial landscape in
China.1O De facto local protectionism results from the ability of local
people's congresses to remove judges. Il Fear of removal from
comfortable positions of power unduly influences judges to ensure
that local businesses and agencies-often engaging in piracy,
counterfeiting, and infringement-succeed in lawsuits irrespective of
the merits of a case. 12 Thus, impartiality is forgone in favor of
protecting the interests of local businesses and agencies-usually to
the detriment of international competitors.

B. Lack ofJudicial Transparency and Predictability in the Judiciary

In addition to facing issues such as corruption and local
protectionism, international businesses accustomed to common law
systems face unpredictable judicial determinations when they seek to
enforce patent rights in China. This unpredictability stems from
China's lack of judicial transparency in three important areas: the
precedential value of case law, the reporting of judicial decisions, and
the construction of patent claims.
First, judicial determinations in China lack predictability because
the Chinese legal system does not accept or recognize cases as a
source of law. 13 China has a civil law instead of common law
system. 14 Unlike common law, the Chinese system is based around
several codes that guide the law. Therefore, international businesses
cannot look to judicial decisions for indications of the way a court
may rule in a patent infringement proceeding.15 And even if China
did recognize cases as legal precedent, opinions reduced to writing
8. Id.
9. See Voiper, supra note I, at 326.
10. Id. at 327.
II. See id. at 327-28.
12. See id. at 328.
13. Id. at 329-30; Ruay Lian Ho, Compliance and ChallenlJes Faced by the Chinese
Patent System under TRIPS, 85 1. PAT. & TRADEMARK On. Soc:'y 504, 514 (2003).
14. See lJenerallv Ho, supra note 13.
15. Id.
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are characteristically brief, without much analysis or legal reasoning
to assist international businesses in determining their legal positions
with much accuracy.16
However, international businesses may flnd refuge in recent
trends where the published decisions of cases involving foreign
parties have provided more legal analysis and legal reasoning. 17
Despite this helpful trend, written decisions still provide little
practical value if the decisions cannot stand as binding precedent.
Consequently, the reporting of decisions that are not recognized as a
valid source of law in China makes judicial determinations
unpredictable for international businesses.
Second, reported judicial decisions provide little guidance for
international businesses seeking to enforce patent rights in China.
For starters, few opinions are published and fewer opinions become
public without editing by China's high court. IX The Supreme
People's Court (SPC) publishes some of its opinions in its oHlcial
Gazette, but these opinions are also edited. IY Even decisions of the
lower courts that may appear in the Gazette are often revised by the
Spc. 20 Of the cases that are decided, there exists "no comprehensive
and searchable system for reporting judicial decisions in China.,,21
Given the highly edited nature of reported cases and the inability to
search for these cases in a comprehensive manner, there is little
transparency in the reporting of judicial decisions in China.
Third, judicial determinations of patent infringement in China
are much more unpredictable because Chinese courts have not
established uniform canons of patent claim construction to assist
patentees and alleged infringers in predicting how courts will
interpret patent c1aims. 22
C. Unsatisfactory Enforcement of Patent Rights
Along with its poor record of judicial transparency, China has
developed a reputation for unsatisfactory enforcement of patent
rights, despite its desire to be known as a respecter of international
patent rights. This is mainly due to China's insuffIcient eHorts to end
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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infringing and illegal activity.23 China's unsatisfactory enforcement
stems from both its inability to persuade authorities to take a serious
look at infringing activities and the largely ineffective sanctions
leveled against infringers. For example, a spokesman of the State
Intellectual Property OHice (SIPO) suggested that bribing local
oflicials may frequently be a prerequisite to initiate investigation of
infringement allegations. 24 Even more troubling, in cases that
necessitate investigation in China, the end result is often "toothless
administrative enforcement" rather than effective police action. 25 The
natural consequence of such policies is that administrative seizures
and fines have become accepted as a necessary business cost by
infringers.26
To China's credit, recent judicial decisions have heightened
restrictions on patent infringement. The criminal threshold quantity
for patent infringement was lowered from 1000 units to 500 units,
but the United States maintains that such quantities still permit
pirates and counterfeiters to operate under a safe harbor on a
commercial production scale. 27 With safe harbors for commercial
scale production of pirated goods and Chinese infringers accepting
administrative fines and seizures as a necessary business cost, China's
record of enforcement of patent rights remains unsatisfactory.

D. Remedies Benefit Imitators Rather than Innovators
In China, available remedies are not only unsatisfactorily applied,
but also benefit imitators rather than innovators because (1)
stringent evidentiary standards coupled with inadequate discovery
procedures make patent enforcement outcomes unfavorable for
patent owners, and (2) patent owners with otherwise meritorious
infringement claims often tlnd their damages awards eviscerated by
determinations of patent invalidity in separate proceedings.
China's stringent evidentiary standards, when coupled with
inadequate discovery procedures, make it more diftlcult to obtain

23. Id. at 326. China's record of unsatisflctory ent()rccment of patent rights led the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) to initiate a WTO action against China in April
2007. Id. at 309-11. The USTR trequently receives complaints about the lack of unit()rm, fair,
and consistent entc)rcement of intellectual property rights and regulations in China's courts. Id.
at 331.
24. Id. at 326.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 325-26.
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preliminary inJunctions and adequate damages awards, thus
complicating patent enforcement dforts. First, an international
business seeking a preliminary injunction to halt infringement must
clearly prove both infringement and irreparable harm.2x But clearly
proving both infringement and irreparable harm may prove
insurmountable without adequate discovery procedures to obtain the
underlying evidence. 2,} In fact, preliminary injunctions may be
nothing more than a fictional remedy in China because the SPC has
instructed lower Chinese courts that preliminary injunctions are
unavailable in cases that involve "non -literal infringement or
complicated technologies. ,,30
Damages awards in China are subject to the same strict
evidentiary standards, making it extremely difficult to obtain
adequate awards through successful patent infringement litigation.
Additionally, infringer's profits form the basis for assessing patent
damages and plaintiffs must rely on preservation of evidence to
gather the pertinent sales and accounting data from the defendant.
Proving damages can be particularly difficult considering the lack of
formal discovery mechanisms in China. 31 Consequently, damages
awards in China are extremely low in comparison to the United
States. 32
Even after international businesses prove damages, patent owners
often find their damages awards eviscerated by determinations of
patent invalidity in separate proceedings. In China, alleged patent
infringers often seek stays of infringement cases by initiating
invalidation actions with the Patent Reexamination Council ("PRC")
to challenge the validity of the infringed patent. 33 Patent invalidation
proceedings may occur parallel with patent infringement litigation of
the underlying patent at issue; if the invalidation proceedings occur
after the infringement litigation, a stay of the infringement award

28. J. Benjamin Bai et aI., What Multinational Companies Need to Know About Patent
Invalidation and Patent Lit(qation in China, ,5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 449, 458-60
(2007).
29. Id.at449.
30. [d. at 459.
31. Id. at 449.
32. Id. Chinese courts are permitted to include reasonable expenses and attorney fees in
calculated damages. Id. This might compensate f()r the costs of assuming the risk of patent
litigation, but recovery of attorney fees in China is rare. Id.
33. Chua, supra note 2, at 154. In tact, international businesses are increasingly
becoming subject to invalidation proceedings bet()re the PRe. Bai et aI., supra note 28, at 449.
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may occur. 34
Invalidation proceedings usually involve invention patents, while
infringement litigation usually applies to utility model patents and
design patents. 3S International businesses owning invention patents
should expect parallel invalidity and infringement proceedings.36
Indeed, it is not uncommon for a patent found to be infringed by
the People's Courts to be subsequently invalidated by the Patent
Reexamination Board (PRE).37 International businesses in these
circumstances will find little assurance in the fact that the
intermediate court reverses decisions of the PRE less than twenty
percent of the time. 3x International businesses thus face multiple
legal hurdles in the quest for patent protection.
E. Effects of the Negative Judicial Trends

International businesses looking to obtain Chinese patent
protection should not only be concerned with the challenges of
obtaining patent protection, but also widespread infringement,
piracy, and counterfeiting after a patent is obtained. 39 This patent
34. Sec3C1lerallvBai et aI., supra note 28.
35. Id. '''Invention' in the Patent Law means any new technical solution relating to a
product, a process or an improvement thercof" Chinacourt, Rules t()r the Implementation of
the
Patent
Law of the
PRC, art.
2
(Dec.
21,
1992),
available at
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id~3327. '''Utility model' in the Patent Law
means any new technical solution relating to the shape, the structure, or their combination, of
.1 product, which is tit t()r practical use." Id. '''Design' in the Patent law means any new design
of the shape, pattcrn, colour, or their combination, of a product, which creates an aesthetic
teeling and is tit t()r industrial application." Id.
36. See.qenerally Bai et aI., supra note 28.
37. See id. at 449. The Patent Reexamination Board examines invalidation requests
under Article 45 of PRC Patent Law. See Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, art.
46, aJ'ailable at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200203/
t20020327 _33872.htm (Aug. 25, 2000). Article 45 allows any individual or entity to
challenge the validity of a newly issued Chinese patent t()r lack of cont(mnance to the PRC
Patent Laws. Id. art. 45.
38. Id.
39. Intringement estimates of all t(>rIm of intellectual property in China exceed 90%.
Volper, supra note I, at 309. Among the intringing products seized at United States customs,
more than 80% originated in China. Id. Estimates of counterteit goods originating in China
exceeds billions of dollars and is growing in double-digit percentages each vear. Kirk Hermann
et aI., Protectin.q Nanotechnol!tqy Intellectual Property ("Nano-IP») In China, 2 NANOTECH. L.
& Bus. 96, 108 (2005). International software companies should be concerned that an
estimated 90% of software being used in China is pirated. Id. Additionally, a substantial
number of well-known brands being sold in China are estimated to be counterteitapproximately 15 to 20%. Samir B. Dahman, Protectin3 Your IP Rights in China: An Overview
o{the Process, I ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 63, 63 (2006). According to the U.S. Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection, China is the largest counterteiter. Emma Schwartz, China
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infringement harms businesses in at least two ways.
First, patented goods pirated in China result in lost sales and
diluted good will for the patent holder. 40 If infringing goods are
permitted to be sold in China, international businesses do not
benefit from the patent monopoly granted by a Chinese patent and
must determine whether it makes sense to incur the time and
expense required to obtain a Chinese patent.
Second, Chinese businesses making and exporting infringed
goods directly reduce global sales and cause brand name dilution. 41
If Chinese infringers are permitted to make patented products within
China and sell the patented products to countries in which the
patentee has not applied for a patent, it seriously diminishes the
incentive for international businesses to incur the time and expense
required in obtaining patent protection in China.

III. REASONS FOR OBTAINING CHINESE PATENT PROTECTION
Despite China's record of unsatisfactory patent enforcement,
there are compelling reasons for obtaining patent protection in
China. These include the size of the Chinese market, global trends of
business competitors, Chinese accession to most relevant
international intellectual property treaties, and recent Chinese
reforms.
A. The Chinese Market

The vast size of the Chinese market and the anticipated growth
of the Chinese economy may warrant obtaining patent protection in
China. China's potential consumer market is the largest in the world
with approximately 1.3 billion people living in China. 42 In addition,
China's economy is among the fastest growing and is expected to
one day be the world's largest. 43 While the size of the Chinese
Tries New Tactics in Patent Ftqht (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.law.com/
jsp /law/LawArticleFriendly .jsp? id~900005 546611.
40. Dahman, supra note 39.
41. Id.
42. China Population Int()rmation and Research Center, Major F(qures of the 20()()
Population Census, http://www.cpirc.org.cn/en/e5cendatal.htm (Mar. 28,2001).
43. The Chinese economy could surpass Germany and Japan within ten vears and may
eventually overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy within thirty-tive
years. Robert C. Bird, Defendincq Intellectual Property Rights in the RRIC Economies, 43 AM.
Bus. 1.J. 317, 318 (2006). Within three years of the prior publication, China has already
surpassed Germany in terms of GD P making China the third largest economy in the world.
Press Release, China Daily, China Overtakes Germany in Terms of GDP (Jan. 15, 2009),
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market alone may not be enough to tip the scales in favor of
obtaining patent protection in China, it is an encouraging factor.
Assuming that the reforms mentioned below in Section Dare
implemented, Chinese patent protection may provide international
businesses with more satisfactory enforcement. Given the five-year
period for implementation of the reforms, and the twenty-year term
for patent protection, satisfactory patent enforcement seems much
more plausible during the latter years of the patent term. If patent
enforcement becomes satisfactory as a result of these reforms, the
vast size of the Chinese market becomes a compelling factor. The
patent will then provide a limited monopoly for the remainder of the
patent term, thus paying huge dividends for the international
businesses that are willing to assume the risk of obtaining patent
protection with the hopes that enforcement becomes satisfactory.
B. Global Business Competitors

Trends in global competition suggest that many international
businesses are attempting to establish a dominant patent position in
China. 44 China has seen a noticeable increase in the number of
international businesses applying for patent protection within its
borders4s since it signed the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Accord).46 At the same time,
there has been a huge increase in the number of Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT) applications being filed at the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) from Chinese competitors. 47
Consequently, international businesses are likely to find themselves

aJ'ailable at http://www.chinadaily.com.en/china/2009-01/15/contenc7400438.htm.
44. Ken Howard, Patent F(qhts Rumble in China, 3 NATURE REVIEWS DRUl;
DISCOVERY 988 (2004).
45. Yolper, supra note 1, at 324; Press Release, China Daily, Patent Applications
Increase in First Half Year (Aug. 29, 2006), available at http://www.china.org.cn/
english/BAT/179386.htm.
46. The TIUPS Accord was an attempt to provide and implement unif(mnity with
respect to intellectual property rights. WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements,
Intellectual Property: Protection and Enf(lrCement, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tiLe/agrm7 _e.htm. Under a common set of international
regulations, signatories (fellow WTO members) must establish a minimum level of protection,
thereby striking an agreed-upon balance between long-term benefits and short-term costs of
protective provisions. [d.
47. Yolper, supra note 1, at 324. The PCT was f(lrmed by the World Intellectual
Property Organization. It is an international agreement that allows f(lr the tiling of a single
patent application to have effect in all of the signatory states. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June
19,1970,28 U.S.T. 7645,1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
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facing increased competition for Chinese patent rights not only from
other international companies, but also from Chinese companies
themselves. If global competitors are assuming the risks of obtaining
Chinese patent protection, following suit may be necessary to remain
competitive on a global scale.
C. China is a Signatory to Most Major International IP Treaties
China's status as a signatory to a majority of the important
international intellectual property treaties 4X argues in favor of
obtaining patent protection in China. Treaties that China has signed
include the Paris Convention,49 the Madrid Agreement,SO the
Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement,Sl the Berne
48. Chua, supra note 2, at 150.
49. See Paris Convention fCJr the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967,21 U.ST. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. The Paris
Convention fCJ[Jned a union among signing countries fCJr the protection of industrial property,
including the protection of patents, utility models, industrial designs, tradenurks, service
marks, trade names, indications of source or origin, and protection against unfair competition.
Id. art. 1, § 1. Chin,l became a member of the Paris Union, as fCJ[Jlled by the Paris
Convention, on December 19, 1984. World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris
Notification No. 114, Accession by the People's Republic ofChilu, Dec. 19, 1984, aJ'ailable
at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/paris/treaty_paris_114.html.
50. See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr.
14,1891, as revised at Stockholm, July 14,1967,828 U.N.T.S. 389. The Madrid Agreement
allows owners of trademarks or service marks to secure protection fCJr their nationally registered
marks in any of the contracting states by filing the marks at the International Bureau of
Intellectual Property. !d. art. I, § 2. China's accession to the Madrid Agreement became
effective on October 4, 1989 subject to declaration concerning Article 14(2)( d) that limited
applicability of the agreement to marks registered on or after this date. World Intellectual
Property Organization, Madrid Notification No. 41, Accession by the People's Republic of
China, July 4, 1989, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/madridgp/treaty_madrid_gp_41.html. On July 24, 2003, China withdrew its declaration under
Article 14(2)(d) of the Madrid Agreement. World Intellectual Property Organization, Madrid
Notification No. 145, Notification by the People's Republic of China: Withdrawal of
Declaration
Concerning
Article
14( 2)( d),
(July
24,
2003),
al'ailable
at
http://\\'\\w.wipo.int/edocs/ncltdclcs/en/madrid-gp/treaty_madrid_gp_ 145.html.
51. The Madrid Protocol improves the flexibility of the Madrid Agreement by creating a
system of international registr,uion of marks which provides protection in each designated
Contracting Party. World Intellectual Property Organization, Summary of the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (1891) and the Protocol
Relating to that Agreement (1989), alJailable at Imp:! /w\\w.wipo.int/treaties/en/
registration/madrid_protocol/sul11mary _madrid.htm!. China deposited its instrul11ent of
accession to the Madrid Protocol on September I, 1995. World Intellectual Property
Organization, Madrid Notification No. 69, Accession by the People's Republic of China,
(Sept. 6, 1995), available at http://\\ww.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/madridp-gp/
tre'lty_madridp_gp_69.html. The Madrid Protocol entered into tCJrce with respect to China on
April I, 1996, subject to a declaration under Article 14( 5) that no protections under the
agreement would be extended betclre this date. World Intellectll<ll Property Organization,
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Convention,52 and the Patent Cooperation Treaty53-arguably the
most important international treaty concerning patent protection.
China's willingness to participate in all major intellectual property
treaties suggests that it is attempting to become a responsible player
in the international patent arena. Because the country has, at least
superficially,54 agreed to abide by these international norms,
obtaining patent protection in China will be an increasingly
important part of an international patent strategy.
D. Chinese Reforms

Probably the most significant reason for obtaining patent
protection in China going forward is the growing potential for
reform. Not only have Chinese oflicials publicly acknowledged the
country's unsatisfactory enforcement record 55 and the need to
Madrid Notification No. 79, (Feb. 1, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
notdocs/en/madridp-gp/treaty_madridp_gp_79.html. China subsequently withdrew its
declaration concerning Article 14( 5). World Intellectual Property Organization, Madrid
:-.Jotification No. 80, (june 19, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/
madridp-gp/treaty_madridp_gp_80.html.
52. See lIenerally Herne Convention t()r the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, july 24,1971, and amended on October 2, 1979,828
U.N.T.S. 221. The purpose of the Herne Convention was to create a unit(mn means of
protecting "the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works .... " See id. intro. China
became a member of the Herne Union on October 15, 1992, the date in which the Berne
Convention entered into t(lrCe regarding China. World Intellectual Property Organization,
Herne Notitication No. 140, Accession by the People's Republic of China, (July 15, 1992),
aJ'ailable at http://www .wip(l.int/ed(lcs/n(ltdocs/ en/berne/treaty_berncl40 .html.
53. Patent Cooperation Treaty, june 19, 1970,28 U.5.T. 7645. The PCT entered into
t(lrCe with respect to China on january 1, 1994. World Intellectual Property Organization,
PCT Notitication No. 81, Accession by the People's Republic of China, (Oct. 1, 1993),
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/pct/treaty_pcC81.html. The PCT
created a system of facilitating international patent tilings. Jay Erstling & Isabelle Houtillon,
77Je Patent Cooperation Treaty: At the Center of the International Patent System, 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1583, 1583 (2006). China has set t(ltth provisions t(lr implementation of
the PCT. See Provisions Concerning the Implementation of the Patent Cooperation Treaty in
China (effective jan. I, 1994) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.eng.yn.gov.cn/
yunnan English/ 144397762564194304/20050616/353272 .html.
54. "Superticially," because international agreements such as these typically have no real
ent(lrCement mechanism. However, the drawing up of such an agreement and China's
signature to it represent early steps to the creation of an international patent standard.
55. In a recent intellectual property compendium, China's State Council recognized
that "China's intellectual property system is imperfect," people in China have a "poor sense on
intellectual property," and "intellectual property intringements are serious." Circular of the
State Council on Printing and Issuing of the National Intellectual Property Strategy
Compendium, § 1(3) (Circulated by the State Council on june 5,2008) (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub /FD LEN/Laws/law_en_int(l. jsp?d(lcid=94069 [hereinafter II'
Strategy CompendiumJ.
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improve intellectual property protection before becoming a truly
developed nation, but China has taken concrete action towards
initiating patent enforcement reforms. 56 Likewise, Chinese businesses
are increasingly showing respect for patent laws, rather than
opposing or ignoring them. 57 Perhaps most importantly, though, the
SPC has recognized that interference from the executive branch
exists, and that Chinese parties do in fact benefit from corruption,
bribery, and protectionism. 5x
The Supreme People's Court (SPC), in an effort to counter these
perceptions, has introduced regulations and judicial interpretations
combating piracy, infringement, and counterfeiting. 59 As part of this
effort, the SPC instituted two five-year reform plans. The first FiveYear People's Court Reform Plan was unveiled in 1999. It included
the goals of implementing anti-corruption regulations and creating a
limited form of discovery in an efrort to promote a more adversarialtype, common law system of proceedings.60 The second Five-Year
People's Courts Reform Plan was unveiled in 2005. It included the
bold, new concepts of guaranteeing financial independence for
Chinese courts, employing significant cases as guidelines for
interpreting legal outcomes in order to establish a more meaningful
system of precedent, and bringing uniformity to the understanding
of Chinese laws by courts and practitioners throughout China. 61
More recently, in 2008, the Communist Party of China (CPC)
revealed its own ambitious five-year plan to prevent and punish
corruption. 62 The CPC called for unprecedented reforms, such as
intense supervision of government officials at all levels, with
requirements that they be closely examined for abuse of their
positions in acquiring money, bribes, or otherwise interfering with
markets or trade. 63 Additionally, the plan calls for media oversight by
encouraging constructive criticism of the government and the

56. Tian Lipu, the Commissioner of the State Intellectual Property Oltice, expressed
China's need to switch from "made in China" to "invented in China." Volper, supra note 1, at
323.
57. Kirk Hermann et a!., Protecti1!H Nanotechno/I{IfY Intellectua/l'roper~v ("Nano-IP") in
China,2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 96, lOS (2005).
5S. Chua, supra note 2.
59. Id. at 150.
60. Id. at 137.
61. Id. at 13S.
62. Chinacourt, CPC Publicizes Party's Five-year Ami-Corruption Plan (Junc 23,
200S), available at http://en.chinacourt.org/pubIic/ detail.php?id=4354.
63. Id.
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Cpc. 64
Although the actual impact these reforms will have on improving
enforcement of Chinese patents is as yet unknown, they are, at least,
a step in the right direction. If SPC reforms can create a judicial
system that more closely comports with international expectations
regarding transparency, impartiality, and satisfactory enforcement,
then much of the concern surrounding China's judicial system will
be alleviated. Given the twenty-year term for Chinese patent
protection, these reforms could improve the patent landscape 111
China long before the expiration of patents currently being issued.
IV. CREATING THE PERCEPTION OF A CHINESE ENTERPRISE
DIMINISHES THE INCENTIVES FOR NEGATIVE TRENDS

Creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise diminishes the
negative impacts of corruption, bribery, and local protectionism on
international businesses operating in China. This perception blurs
perceived distinctions between such businesses and local Chinese
enterprises. A given company's success in creating such a perception
is directly proportional to its presence within China-the greater the
number of local Chinese citizens employed as managers, researchers,
and laborers, the more successful the international business will be in
creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise. Likewise, the greater
the percentage of ownership retained by local Chinese citizens, the
more it will blur the perceived distinctions between the international
business operating in China and local Chinese enterprises that are
engaged in piracy, counterfeiting, or infringement.
When an international business fails to successfully create the
perception of a Chinese enterprise, judicial officials have strong
incentives to rule against the international business, regardless of the
merits of the case. Upholding the patent monopoly of an
international business will have a direct, negative impact not only on
local entrepreneurs who are parties to the action, but on the entire
local economy. For example, a permanent injunction against the sale
of infringed goods has the potential to shut down a factory that

64. See id. Consistent with these calls t(lr rdilfI11 the cre's highest "anti-graft" ofticial
has also called ti,r improving ami-corruption laws. He Guoqiang, crc Central Commission
ti,r Discipline Inspection Secretary, has stated that "anti-graft laws should be strictly
implemented and violators... severely punished... to cultivate a legal environment in
fighting corruption." Chinacourt, Top Chinese Anti-graft Ofticial Urges Retter Laws Against
Corruption
(No\'.
10,
20(8),
available
at
http://cn.chinacourt.org/public/
detail.php?id=431l5.
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reproduced the goods. The consequences of such action could be
devastating to a local economy in a rural Chinese setting. Factory
workers would lose their jobs, tax revenues would decrease, and the
people could even become unruly. Avoidance of such consequences
provides a strong incentive for the perpetuation of corruption,
bribery, and local protection, often resulting in awards that are
favorable to pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers.
On the other hand, international businesses that successfully
create the perception of a Chinese enterprise invite administrative
and judicial officials to focus more on the merits of patent
enforcement actions and less on the identity of the parties involved.
Such businesses diminish the incentives for corruption by altering the
cost-benefit analysis and the consequences of the enforcement
decision. When an international business successfully creates the
perception of a Chinese enterprise, the benefits of invalidating its
patents and ruling in favor of pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers
are less apparent. The decision becomes more outcome-neutral
because a ruling against the international business then also has
direct, negative consequences for the local economy. That is, if the
patent of an international business with the perception of a Chinese
enterprise is invalidated and infringement is not found, the
international business, whose sole reason for doing business in China
is to exploit its patent monopoly, may be forced to close its Chinese
operations. This, in turn, could lead to the loss of local jobs and
decreased tax revenues much in the same way that a judgment
against an entirely local enterprise would. The more Chinese citizens
employed by an international business, the greater the negative
impact of unsatisfactory patent enforcement.
Thus, creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise weakens
the notion that international businesses asserting their patents will
destabilize local Chinese economies. International businesses that
successfully create the perception of a Chinese enterprise become
indistinguishable from other local Chinese enterprises that otherwise
resort to piracy, counterfeiting, or infringement.
V. CHINESE LAWS RESTRICT THE CREATION OF A PERCEPTION OF A
CHINESE ENTERPRISE

Chinese law limits opportunities for intcrnationa' businesses to
create the perception of a Chinese enterprise in two important ways:
(1) it proscribes foreign investment in certain industries, and (2) it
proscribes foreign ownership of domestic Chinese enterprises.
220

I
(
\
I

I
{

SPRING

2009

Wielding the Double-Edged Sword

A. Chinese Law Proscribes Foreign Investment in Chinese Enterprises

International businesses looking to create the perception of a
Chinese enterprise must first determine whether the industry of their
inventions is one in which the Chinese government encourages,
restricts, or prohibits foreign investment. 65 The Chinese government
prohibits foreign investment 111 industries with substantial
implications
on
economic
security,
resource
utilization,
environmental protection, the public interest, and national security.66
Foreign investment in these prohibited industries is foreclosed. 67
Foreign investment in China is therefore limited to those
industries designated as encouraged6~ or restricted. 6Y Ideally,
international businesses seeking to create the perception of a Chinese
65. The Chinese government publishes a catalog listing industries in which f()reign
investment is encouraged, restricted, or prohibited. Catalogue jilr the Guidance of Forei.Hn
Im'estment Industries, Issued by the State Development and Refimn Commission and the
Ministry of Commerce, MOFCOM Order [2007] No. 57 on 31 Oct., 2007 (Effective as of
Dec. 1,2007) [hereinafter ForeilIn Investment CatallllJue]. The Foreii,n Im'estment CatallllJue is
segmented into three catalogs including the Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment
Industries [hereinafter Encouraged Catalogue], the Catalogue of Restricted Foreign
Investment Industries [hereinafter Restricted Catalogue], and the Catalogue of Prohibited
Foreign Investment Industries [hereinafter Prohibited Catalogue].
66. Prohibited Catalogue, supra note 65. Article I of the Prohibited Catalogue
proscribes Fanning, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery Industries; Article II proscribes
certain Mining and Quarrying Industries; Article III proscribes particular aspects of the
Manut:lCturing Industry; Article IV proscribes resource utilization of Production and Supply of
Power, Gas and Water; Article V proscribes public interest industries involving Communication
and Transportation, Storage, as well as Post and Telecommunication Services; Article VI
proscribes Leasing and Commercial Service Industry; Article VII proscribes industries pertinent
to opening research bcilities in China, including Scientific Research and Technical Services
Industries, and Geological Prospecting; Article VIII proscribes industries where environmental
impact may be a concern including Irrigation, Environment, and Public Utilities Management;
Article IX proscribes the public interest in Education; Article X proscribes industries which may
have a national security impact such as Art, Sports, and Entertainment Industries; and Articles
XI and XII proscribe catch-all of Other Industries involving projects impacting military
facilities or industries governed by treaties. Id.
67. Id. Press Release, China Business Review, China's 2007 Foreign Investment Guide
(Jan. & Feb. 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter China Business Review].
68. Encouraged Catalogue, supra note 65. Encouraged f()reign investment industries
are those industries in which research, development, and manufacturing of goods and services
may lead to improved national infrastructure, high-technology transfer, knowledge transfer, or
improved resource utilization, to name a tew. See id. Encouraged investment industries
generally overlap those in which investment is restricted or prohibited. For example, Article I
of the Encouraged Catalogue carries the same title of Article I of the Restricted Catalogue, as
well as Article I of the Prohibited Catalogue covering Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry
and Fishery Industries. See cqenerally Foreiqn InFestment Catalltque, supra note 65. The primary
difference lies in the scope ofthe permissions or prohibitions within each category. Id.
69. See F(}re~qn Investment CatallllJue, supra note 65.

221

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 5

enterprise should fall within an encouraged industry because of the
potential for incentives to the business/o such as favorable tax
treatment or relative ease in obtaining operational permits and
licenses. 7! Thus, international businesses falling within an
encouraged industry stand the greatest chance for success.
International business falling within a restricted industry may
have more difficulty creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise
as restrictions may be prohibitive. 72 For example, difficulty in
obtaining requisite governmental operating permits and licenses may
be increased. 73 The complete range of incentives and restrictions vary
by industry, necessitating the retention of local Chinese counsel for
businesses contemplating entry into a restricted industry. Such
prohibitions discourage businesses falling within the restricted
industries from creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise.
B. Chinese Law Proscribes Foreign Ownership of Chinese Enterprises

Another barrier to international business creating the perception
of a Chinese enterprise is the restriction of foreign ownership of
Chinese enterprises. Foreign ownership interests in domestic Chinese
enterprises are limited to four primary vehicles: (1) Sino-Foreign
Equity Joint Ventures, (2) Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures,
(3) Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, or (4) mergers and
acquisitions of domestic Chinese enterprises?4
1. Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures
One way to acquire ownership interests in Chinese enterprises is
through Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (EJV).7s EJVs are

70. See China Business Revievi, supra note 67.
71. Cf id. China has been scaling back favorable policies towards ti)reign investment,
especially preferential tax policies. [d.
72. Restricted t()reign investment industries may require the Chinese party to hold J
majority of the shares. See JJenerally Restricted Catalogue, supra note 70. Restricted t()reign
investment industries may alternatively limit ownership interests to equity joint ventures or
contractual joint ventures. See id. art. 1,12; China Business Review, supra note 67.
73. Fred M. Greguras, hlJ'estment and Operatincq in Restricted Industries in China, Oct.
27,
2004,
http://www.fenwick.com/d()(st()re/PublicJti(llls/O)rp()rate/
In\'escOperatin~In_China.pdt: "Restricted category projects are also subject to higher-level
g()\'ernment approvals." China Business Review, supra note 67.
74. Foreign ownership interests in domestic Chinese enterprises are subject to the
categorical investment restrictions set t()rth in the Foreign Investment Catalog. Sce supra text
accompanying notes 65-68.
75. See JJcncrally Regulations t()r the Implementation of the Law on Sino-ti)reign Equity
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established as Chinese limited liability companies. 76 They are
incorporated and managed jointly by the international business and a
Chinese party.77 "Numerous rules and regulations enacted on
different legislative levels complete the rather comprehensive legal
framework governing EJVs."n One particular provision related to
ownership and control is that parties to an EJV may jointly
contribute capital "in cash or in kind."79 For EJVs, "[t]he parties to
the venture shall share the profits, risks and losses in proportion to
their respective contributions to the registered capital. "so
International businesses choosing the EJV organizational
structure should assess both profit and loss expectations, as well as
retention of operational control and managerial decision making, in
proportion to the respective capital contributions. Thus,
international businesses choosing EJVs as an investment strategy may
find limited ability to control the strategy and direction of the
Chinese enterprise. However, one possible advantage of an EJV is
that it may be perceived as a Chinese enterprise in direct proportion
to the extent to which Chinese ownership is retained.
2. Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures
Another means of acquiring ownership interests in Chinese
enterprises are Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures (CJVS).Hl

Joint Ventures (promulgated by the State Council, July 22, 2001) (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.tai.gov.cn/pub/DI_EN/Laws/law_en_int().jsp?docid=51062; Law of the
People's Republic of China on Chinese-t()reign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by the
National People's Congress, Mar. 15,2001) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.tai.gov.cn/
pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_int(l.jsp?docid=51033 [hereinafter EJV Laws]. EJVs are t()lInded
upon principles of equality and mutual benefit. Id. art. I. EJVs are subject to government
approval. Id.
76. EJV Laws, supra note 75, art. 4; Lutz-Christian Wolff: China's Prirate
Intt"rnational im'estment Law: One-way Street Into PRC Law?, 56 AM. J. COMPo L. 1039,
1041 (200S).
77. EJV Laws, supra note 75, art. 1; Wolff: supra note 76, at 1041-42.
7S. Wolff: supra note 76, at 1041.
79. EJV Laws, supra note 75, art. 5. Investment may also be made in the t(mn of
industrial property rights. Id. Howe\'er, equipment and technoloh'Y f(mning the basis of an
international businesses' contribution has to be "advanced technology and equipment" that
ti.t1tils a Chinese national need. Id.
SO. Id. art. 4; Sinova Management Consultancy, Ltd" Four Main Types oj' Foreign
/1IJ'cstment
m
China,
I,
available
at
http://www.sinO\·a.wm/_tiles/
Fourmaintypesotl()reigninvestmentinChina.pdf [hereinafter Four Investment Types]. "The
proportion of the investment contributed by the f()reign joint venture(s) shall generally not be
less than 25% of the registered capital of a joint venture." Id.
SI. See Hcncrallv Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual
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CNs, like EJVs, are Chinese enterprises established by joint
investment between international businesses and Chinese
entrepreneurs, which the Chinese Government must approve. X2
Unlike EJVs, which require strictly proportioned shares, CJVs offer
greater flexibility in freedom to contract and organizational
structure. X3 An additional aspect of CJV flexibility is the way
respective values of capital contributions are determined. Parties to a
CN can decide the method of evaluating contributions, as well as
the actual value of the contributions themseives.X4
"A [CJV] project usually involves the foreign partner to provide
most or all of the funds and technology, key machineries whilst the
Chinese partner will contribute land, facilities, natural resources and
perhaps a limited amount of funding. "X5 Given the changing
economic climate in China, CJVs are less common. X6 One reason for
their decreased popularity is the increased bargaining position of
Chinese entrepreneurs in terms of capital and technical know-howa result of Chinese economic expansion and an influx of foreign
investment over the last several decades.
Despite the decreased popularity of CJVs, flexibility in value
assessments of contributions to a CJV can be particularly attractive to
international businesses with dominant patent portfolios. These
businesses find CJVs attractive because the value of contributions in
determining ownership and managerial retention can be based on
knowledge and technology. Thus, international businesses with
dominant patent portfolios in a given industry can theoretically
negotiate a premium for their contributions, resulting in a
disproportionately high share of ownership and managerial control.
However, government supervision of these contracts could result
in the rejection of CJVs that attempt to provide a disproportionate
benefit to international businesses. x7 Nonetheless, savvy international
joint Ventures (Order of the President, No. 40, Oct. 31, 2000), al'ailablc at
http://www.fui.gov.cn/pub/FDCEN/Laws/law_en_inhjsp?docid=SI 032 [hereinafter CjV
Laws].
82. See id. arts. 1-6; see also Four InJ'estment 7.'vpes, supra note 80.
83. In particular, profit and loss sharing is determined as set t()rth by contract rather
than dictated by equity interests. See CjV Laws, supra note 81, art. 2; see also Four Irtl'cstment
Types, supra note 80.
84. In addition, operational and management control are determined by the ejY,
subject to government approval. CjY Laws, supra note 81, art. II.
8S. Four Irtl'estment Types, supra note 80.
86. Id.
87. Article I of the CjY Laws states that CjYs are established upon principles of
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businesses with dominant patent portfolios may be able to invest via
CJVs while also negotiating favorable contracts that place a premium
on their patent protection. In this regard, international businesses
can theoretically contribute less capital in the form of cash so that
the endeavor can be perceived predominantly as a Chinese
enterprise, while the international business retains a majority stake in
operational control and profitability.
3. Wholly-Owned Foreign Enterprises

Ownership in a Chinese enterprise may also be established
through creation of Wholly-Owned Foreign Enterprises (WOFEs).gg
In contrast to the joint structure of EJVs and CJVs, WFOEs are, as
their name implies, fully invested and operated by international
businesses as a Chinese limited liability company.~Y Thus, liability is
limited to initial capital and asset contributions. YO WOFEs provide
international businesses with full control over "major decisions,
products, costs, and employee culture. They also allow strategic
alignment with the parent company and greater protection of
intellectual property. "YI
Despite these advantages, WOFEs may be difficult investment
vehicles for creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise, because
the legal status is one of a wholly-owned foreign enterprise. As such,
local courts and officials, knowing the entity to be owned by foreign
interests, may not perceive the international business as a Chinese
equality and mutual benetit. Articles 5 and 6 of the CJV Laws discuss government approval.
Thus, the approval authorities are able to reject contractual joint ventures that do not comport
with equality and mutual benefit---disapproval is probably likely where the greater disadvantage
lies with the Chinese partner. CJV Laws, supra note 86, Jrt. 1.
88. See ,qenerallv Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-capital Enterprises,
(order of the President, No. 41, Oct. 31, 2000), available at http://\\ww.tai.gov.cn/
pu b/F D I_EN/Laws/la\\'_en_info.jsp?docid=51 034 [hereinafter WOFE Laws]. WOFEs are set
up in China by international businesses with only their own capital. See id. art. 2. But branches
of international businesses set up in China are not included. See id. WOFEs are permitted to
advance development of China's national economy, Id. art. 3, In particular, "[t]he State may
encourage the establishment of t()reign capital enterprises that are export-oriented or
technologically advanced WOFEs." Id. In this regard, WOFEs are subject to examination and
approval by the Chinese government. See id. art. 6.
89. Four Im'c.rtment Types, supra note 80, at 2,
90. Id.
91. Id. WOrEs operation,ll and managerial control are only limited by their "approved"
articles of association. WOFE Laws, supra note 88, art. 11. Thus, once the appropriate
governmental authority approves a WOFE's articles of association, the management and
operation of the WOrE is "free trom any interference" provided that it otherwise operates
within the con tines of Chinese law. Sec id. art. 11.
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enterprise in the same way as an EJV or CJV.
While maintaining control over Chinese operations IS an
important aspect to successfully obtaining and enforcing patent
protection in China, the decreased ability of WOfEs to create the
perception of a Chinese enterprise may outweigh the advantage of
maintaining complete control. Yet, where complete control is
essential to a business objective, WOFEs should not be overlooked.
4. Mergers and acquisitions of domestic Chinese enterprises

International businesses can also acquire ownership interests in
domestic Chinese enterprises through mergers and acquisitions.lJ2
Mergers and acquisitions of domestic Chinese enterprises may occur
through Equity Mergers and Acquisitions (EMAs) or through Asset
Mergers and Acquisitions (AMAs).<J3
EMAs come in two forms. International businesses can either
buy equity stakes from shareholders of Chinese enterprises,94 or they
can "subscribe to the increase in the registered capital" of the
Chinese enterprise such that the Chinese enterprise becomes a
foreign-investment enterprise (FIE).95 EMAs confer the advantage of
ownership of the Chinese enterprise in proportion to its equity
purchase, but EMAs pose greater risks than AMAs because of the
increased risk of debt acquisition. 96 In this regard, international
businesses may learn that in addition to acquiring an ownership
92. See lfenerally Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors, (Ministry of Commerce, Order No. 10, Sept. 8, 2006),
available
at
http://www.tai.gov .en/pub /FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_intc).jsp?docid=66925
[hereinafter MA Laws j. The MA Laws were adopted, inter alia, with a goal of "introducing
advanced technologies and management experience trom abroad" and "improving the
utilization oft()reign investment." Id. art. 1. In addition, mergers and acquisitions are "subject
to the approval ofthe examination and approval authorities[ .j" Id. art. 6. As such, mergers and
acquisitions that do introduce technical knowledge or expertise into China may not be
approved by the Chinese government. Mergers and acquisitions of Chinese enterprises are also
subject to the limitations set tc>rth in the Guidance Catalog of Fort"i.Hn Inl'estment Catal'lque.
See, ceq., id. art. 4.
93. See MA Laws, supra note 92, art. 2. In other words, international businesses can
acquire ownership interests in Chinese enterprises through "stock purchase" Jnd "asset
acquisition." Zhang Zhong Dong & Chen Zheng jun, Le..qal AnaZvsis o(Asset Acquisition by
Foreifrn Inl'estors, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE (June 2008), at I, al'ailable at
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/ 1938497/ChJnnclj75 76/Legal-Analysis-,)f
Asset-Acquisition -by- F,)reign- Investors.html.
94. See MA Laws, supra note 92, art. 2. HoweVer, the Chinese enterprise cannot be
engaged in t()reign investment. See id.
95. Seeid.
96. See Zhang & Chen, supra note 93.
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interest in the Chinese enterprise may also result in acquiring the
burden of paying back debts owed by the Chinese enterprise. 97
AMAs reduce the risk of these debt traps because the only
possible liabilities associated with the acquisition of assets arise if the
Chinese enterprise had previously mortgaged the newly acquired
asset.,)H This mortgage trap transfers liability to the international
business regardless of whether the Chinese enterprise misrepresented
facts about the mortgage.')') To minimize these risks, an international
business should check the status of the target acquisition assets
before acquiring them. 100
AMAs can also take two forms. International businesses can form
an FIE and use it to facilitate acquisition of a Chinese enterprise's
assets by agreement to operate the assets. 101 Alternatively, the
international business can buy the assets of the Chinese enterprise
through agreement and let the asset investment form the basis to set
up an FIE to operate the assets. 102 In addition to the avoidance of
debt traps, AMAs allow selective acquisition of desirable assets of the
Chinese enterprise. 103
Mergers and acquisitions of existing Chinese enterprises may be
the best way to create the perception of a Chinese enterprise because
the Chinese enterprise will already have a proven record as a local
enterprise and could already be benefiting from local protectionism,
bribery, and corruption. The proportionate change in ownership may
not be enough to affect any existing relationships between the newly
acquired Chinese enterprise and the local community. Nor will the
perception of the Chinese enterprise likely change as a result of the
merger and acquisition.
International businesses might consider buying into existing
Chinese enterprises where the enterprise has an excellent reputation
in the community as well as the manufacturing capacity and existing
workforce necessary to produce the patented product on a
commercial scale. In addition, international businesses might
consider buying into existing Chinese enterprises that are already

97. Id.
98. See id.

99. Id.
100. Id. Status int()rmation of "immovable property and land can easily be obtained trom
the relevant government authorities." Id.
101. See MA Laws, supra note 92, art. 2; see also Zhang & Chen, supra note 93.
102. See MA Laws, supra note 92, art. 2.; see also Zhang & Chen, supra note 93.
103. Zhang & Chen, supra note 93.
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engaged in pirating, counterfeiting, or infringing their patented
technology, effectively eliminating the illegal competition while
creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise.
VI. CREATING THE PERCEPTION OF A CHINESE ENTERPRISE TO
OBTAIN AND ENFORCE CHINESE PATENT PROTECTION

Creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise is essential to
successfully wield the double-edged sword of obtaining and
enforcing patent protection in China. Methods of creating the
perception of a Chinese enterprise include: (1) opening research
facilities in China to develop and patent inventions in China, (2)
acquiring a total or partial stake in a Chinese enterprise and licensing
the patented technology to the acquired Chinese enterprise, and (3)
granting exclusive licenses to the Chinese enterprise to market the
patented technology within China.104
A. Opening Research Facilities in China to Develop and Patent
Inventions
International businesses seeking to create the perception of a
Chinese enterprise can benefit from several distinct advantages by
opening research facilities in China to develop and patent inventions
within China. This strategy will command more respect from
Chinese officials because the international business employing this
strategy will be directly advancing China's national interest in
transforming its reputation from "made in China" to "invented in
China." 105 Therefore, international businesses conducting research in
Chinese facilities probably would file a Chinese national patent
application first. 106 Later, they can file a PCT application claiming the
benefit of the Chinese patent's filing date.!07 Using this pattern of
104. Volper, supra note I, at 315.
105. See supra text accompanying note 56. China's national interest is to "build an
innovative country." SeegeneralZv II' Stratet,')' Compendium, supra note 55.
106. Under China's Patent Law inventions made in China must be tiled domestically in
China first. However, a recent amendment to China's Patent Law adopted by the National
People's Congress, which becomes effective Oct. I, 2009, permits inventors to apply t,)r
patents in ti)reign countries bet-,)re filing domestically in China. Bur ti)reign patent tilings are
subject to government review ti)r a determination as to whether the subject matter of invention
should be kept as a national secret. The amendment is intended to encourage innovation and
improve China's "international competitiveness." See lfeneralZv China Court, China Revises
Patent
Law
to
Encourage
Innovation
(jan.
13,
2009),
aJ'ailable
at
http://en.chinac()urt.()rg/public/ detail.php?id~4390.
107. For an overview of PCT application filing procedure, see generally Erstling &
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filing patent applications will directly advance China's national
interest because China can then claim that technology invented by
the foreign owners of the research facilities was invented in China.
International businesses employing this strategy will likely benefit
from the local good will that ordinarily attaches to local Chinese
enterprises.
Inventing and patenting technology in China that culminates in
a Chinese national patent increases the likelihood that Chinese
courts will uphold the patent during a patent infringement action or
validity challenge. Because owning and asserting a Chinese patent
creates the perception of a Chinese enterprise, this strategy reduces
the home-field advantage that Chinese pirates, counterfeiters, and
infringers might otherwise maintain. From the perception of a local
Chinese court evaluating the patent, the playing field becomes that
of a Chinese innovator versus a Chinese competitor, rather than a
foreign innovator versus a Chinese competitor. Cases will thus be
decided more on the merits and less on local biases.
Retaining complete ownership and control of the enterprise is
also a prudent practice for international businesses developing
inventions in China. Without complete ownership, local Chinese
investment partners may be able to assert ownership of any
proprietary technology and subsequent patents directed thereto,
regardless of whether the investors' contributions warrant ownership
or not. Greater ownership levels can be accomplished through
investment in WOFEs and complete acquisitions of existing Chinese
en terprises.
B. Acquiring a Total or Partial Stake in a Chinese Enterprise and
Licensing the Patented Technology to the Acquired Chinese Enterprise

International businesses seeking to create the perception of a
Chinese enterprise can also acquire a total or partial stake in a
Chinese enterprise and then license their own patented technologies
to the Chinese enterprise. lOX This acquisition and licensing strategy
confers two advantages. First, the international business retains
ownership and control over the patented technology lO9 while
substantially increasing the perception of a Chinese enterprise.
Second, this may also be more profitable, as income is generated
Routillon, supra note 53.
108. Voiper, supra note 1, at 315.
109. Id.
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from licensing royalties and sales of the patented technology in
proportion to the ownership stake from the acquisition of the
Chinese enterprise.
For example, if an international business making a partial
acquisition chooses to invest via an EJV, its ownership would be
limited in strict proportion to its capital contributions. If it invested
via a CJV, however, the international business may be able to
negotiate a greater ownership stake than it otherwise could have
based strictly on its capital contributions. This is especially true
where the international business has a dominant patent portfolio
with a highly sought after technology. Pursuing this aspect of the
acquisition and licensing strategy increases profits while minimizing
legal ownership and capital contributions. In either case, acquiring
partial ownership of the Chinese enterprise will enable the
international business to present itself predominantly as a Chinese
enterprise while retaining full ownership and control over the
patented technology via the licensing agreement.
Another advantage of partial acquisition is that the Chinese
enterprise can maintain its local Chinese reputation, relationships,
and any benefits it derives therefrom. Likewise, to the extent the
Chinese enterprise benefits from local protectionism, these
protections transfer to the international business.
Acquiring a total ownership stake of the Chinese enterprise, on
the other hand, will effectively transform the Chinese enterprise into
a WOFE. Total acquisition strategy' also has its advantages. The
international business will retain complete ownership of the patented
technology and receive all of the profits. Additionally, a licensing
agreement is no longer necessary when an international business
acquires complete ownership of the Chinese enterprise.
One potential drawback of total acquisition, however, is that the
perception of a Chinese enterprise may be diminished. Chinese
courts and administrative officials will undoubtedly have access to
ownership records. As such, international businesses that totally
acquire Chinese enterprises may be indistinguishable from other
international businesses seeking to enforce their patents in China.
Thus, a total acquisition strategy may do little to counter local
corruption, bribery, and protectionism.
An international business could avoid this drawback by acquiring
a complete ownership stake in a Chinese enterprise that is already
pirating, counterfeiting, or infringing the international business's
patented technology. Pursuing a total acquisition strategy in this
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manner offsets any disadvantages arising from the diminished
perception of being an authentic Chinese enterprise, while gaining
the advantage of removing unlawful competition from the market.
Additionally, acquiring Chinese pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers
allows the international business to retain any benefits previously
derived from local protectionism. Thus, where piracy, counterfeiting,
or infringement of an international business's patented technology is
substantial, total acquisition of the Chinese enterprise engaged
therein may be a viable strategy.
C. Granting Exclusive Licenses to Chinese Enterprises to Make) Use)

and Sell Patented Technology

International businesses seeking to mimmlze risk while
attempting to create the perception of a Chinese enterprise should
consider granting exclusive licenses to existing Chinese enterprises to
make, use, and sell their patented technologies within China. This
strategy provides at least three benefits.
first, it minimizes risk and liability while providing licensing
royalties from sales of the patented invention. International
businesses seeking to exploit the Chinese market in this fashion need
not invest any capital in an existing Chinese enterprise or open up a
research facility. As such, the international business does not assume
any risk of loss from day-to-day operations or insufficient demand of
the patented technology.
Second, international businesses may grant exclusive licenses to
make, use, and sell their patented technology to Chinese enterprises.
This helps derive the full benefits of creating the perception of a
Chinese enterprise without investing capital or assuming the liability
risks of opening research facilities and acquiring existing companies.
Under this strategy, the international business also grants the
Chinese enterprise rights to assert the patented technology against
competition in China. In this regard, the Chinese enterprise assumes
the responsibility of enforcing the patent rights against unlawful
competition and asserting its monopoly to exploit the Chinese
market. By granting an exclusive license, the international business
can retain royalties from sales while avoiding the costs associated
with enforcement of the patent rights in China. The Chinese
enterprise exclusive licensee will probably be on a level playing field
when asserting rights against unlawful Chinese competitors engaged
in piracy, counterfeiting, or infringement of the patented technology
because local officials and judges investigating allegations of
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infringement can objectively assess the merits of patent rights
without local prejudice.
An international business might also consider granting an
exclusive license to an existing Chinese enterprise that actively
engages in pirating, counterfeiting, or infringing the international
business's patented technology. International businesses seeking to
pursue this route of the exclusive licensing strategy can use the threat
of litigation or administrative enforcement as a stick and carrot to
convince the infringer that accepting the licensing agreement will
enable it to continue business as usual without ever having to worry
about future enforcement. Because China is making the necessary
reforms to increase enforceability of patents, such licenses will only
increase in value, thus making this strategy more popular over time.
The international business could further attempt to convince the
pirate, counterfeiter, or infringer that the licensing royalties would
amount to no more than the administrative sanctions or damages
award if found liable by local officials. Therefore, the incentives for
accepting a royalty-bearing license for sales of the patented
technology are increased because the time and expense of defending
enforcement actions are forgone in favor of continuing business as
usual.
Moreover, the threat of preliminary or permanent injunction is
completely eliminated upon acceptance of a licensing agreement so
there is absolutely no risk in having to stop operations altogether by
agreeing to such a licensing provision. Given the availability of
criminal enforcement of patent rights in China, a Chinese infringer
operating on a large enough scale might find such a licensing
agreement a favorable alternative to administrative sanctions or
imprisonment.
VII. CONCLUSION

Obtaining and enforcing patent protection in China is a doubleedged sword. On the negative side, corruption, bribery, and
protectionism permit widespread piracy, counterfeiting, and
infringement in China. On the positive side, the Chinese market is
among the largest potential consumer market and China's economy
has experienced exponential growth. More importantly, trends in
global competition suggest international businesses are increasingly
seeking to obtain patent protectio in China. China's record of recent
reforms is promising, including its status as a signatory to all of the
most significant international intellectual property treaties. Thus,
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despite the negative concerns, substantial positive reasons exist for
obtaining patent protection in China. Given that corruption, bribery,
and protectionism typically favor Chinese enterprises, international
businesses that create the perception of a Chinese enterprise can help
diminish the incentives for Chinese courts to reward pirates,
counterfeiters, and infringers.
An international business that successfully creates the perception
of a Chinese enterprise will be difficult to distinguish from the
pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers that typically benefit from local
corruption, bribery, and protectionism. As this distinction is blurred,
Chinese judicial and administrative officials can begin to focus less on
the identity of parties and more on the merits of the patent claims.
In this regard, creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise is an
effective practical strategy to obtain and enforce patents in China.
International businesses can create the perception of a Chinese
enterprise in three principal ways. First, they can open research
facilities in China to develop and patent technology in there. Second,
they can employ an acquisition and licensing strategy to purchase a
stake in a local Chinese enterprise and to license the patented
technology to the Chinese enterprise. And finally, they can choose to
grant an exclusive license to eXlstmg Chinese enterprises.
International businesses should consult with Chinese counsel to
determine which strategy will best suit their needs and best effectuate
their desire to wield the double-edged sword of patent protection in
China.
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